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CASE COMMENT
WALKING THE SEMANTICS TIGHT-ROPE: DEFINING
"PUBLIC PERFORMANCE" IN
WNET, THIRTEEN v. AEREO, INC.
Bryan Giribaldo*

INTRODUCTION

For every new technological advance in the field of multimedia,
another new wrinkle arises in the struggle between copyright holders
and the entrepreneurs of multimedia services. The streaming of "live"
television broadcasts via the internet is one of the newer ways
technology has put stress on what the true meaning of "public
performances" is within the Copyright Act of 1976 and how it has
transformed the extent of the rights of a copyright holder.
Defendant-appellee Aereo, Inc. (Aereo) allows for its subscribers to
watch broadcast television programs over the internet for a monthly
fee.' Aereo uses a system of antennas and remote hard drives to create
individual copies of programs that Aereo users select to watch either
during the actual broadcast of the program or at some later time.' In this
system, no two Aereo users share the same antenna at the same time and
the signal received by each antenna is used to create an individual copy
3
of the program that is only accessible to that particular user. Two
groups of plaintiffs filed separate copyright infringement actions against
Aereo in the Southern District of New York and both groups moved for
preliminary injunctions barring Aereo from transmitting programs to its
subscribers. 4 The district court denied the preliminary injunction by
relying on Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 5 and concluded that Aereo's
system was not materially distinguishable from the system in
J.D. Candidate, May 2014, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A.,
University of Texas at Austin, 2011. 1 would like to especially thank my mother for her
unconditional love and the strength she has given me.
1. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 683. In order to be able to sustain this process for every Aereo user, Aereo's
facilities contains thousands of antennas to process each user's request. Id. at 682.
4. Id.
5. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding that there was no infringement on the exclusive right of public performance in DVR
playback transmissions because each transmission was made to a single subscriber using a
single unique copy, causing these transmissions to not be performances "to the public.").
*
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Cablevision.6 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court. HELD, that Aereo's transmissions of
unique copies of broadcast television programs created at its users'
requests and transmitted while the programs are still airing on broadcast
television are not "public8 performances" of the plaintiffs' copyrighted
works under Cablevision.
The court's interpretation of the Transmit Clause is inadequate. The
Second Circuit failed to address the question of how one might
rationalize the district court's decision to allow the segmentation of the
"public" under the Transmit Clause of the Copyright Act of 1976.
Properly addressing this question may simplify the dilemma
surrounding the interpretation of this outdated statute.
I. BACKGROUND

The 1976 Copyright Act gives copyright owners several exclusive
rights that are subject to a number of exceptions. 9 One of these
enumerated rights is the exclusive right "in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures
and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly."' 10 The two pertinent words in this clause are the words
"perform" and "publicly." "Perform" means "to recite, render, play,
dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process or,
in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its
images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it
audible."" The definition of "publicly" includes:
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal
circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2)
to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display
of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by
means of any device or process, whether the members of the
public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it
in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
6.

copies

Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("the

Aereo's

system

creates

are

not

Cablevision....").
7. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 696.

8. Id.
9. Id.at 684.
10.
11.

17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2002).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).

materially

distinguishable

from

those

in
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different times.12

This definition is important primarily because of the second clause,
commonly called the Transmit Clause, which is what the Aereo case
hinges upon. 13

A proper analysis of the Transmit Clause must begin with a look at
the history of the Copyright Act of 1976, which is the copyright statute
in effect today. Its predecessor, the Cojrght Act of 1909, lacked
language resembling the Transmit Clause. Two Supreme Court cases,
Fortnightly Corp v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390,15 and
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc., 415 U.S.
394, held that cable television systems that received broadcast
television signals via antenna and retransmitted these signals to its
subscribers via coaxial cable did not "perform" the copyrighted works
and therefore did not infringe the copyright holders' public performance
right. 17 However, in forming the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress
intended to divert from Fortnightly and Teleprompter to bring a cable
television system's retransmission of broadcast television programming
within the scope of the public performance right. 18 Congress coupled
that private
this diversion from case precedent with the caveat
9
liability.'
copyright
from
exempted
are
performances
The technological environment of 1976 made the public-private
performance determination feasible because distinguishing between
12. Id.
13.
14.

WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 685.
Id.

15. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1968)
(holding that the community antenna television systems (CATV) that only received programs
that have been released to the public and carried them by private channels to additional viewers
were unlike broadcasters and did not perform the programs they received and carried).
16.

Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 409 (1974).

Under the definitions of "perform," "display," "publicly," and "transmit" in
section 101, the concepts of public performance and public display cover not
only the initial rendition or showing, but also any further act by which that
rendition or showing is transmitted or communicated to the public ... a CATV
system does not lose its status as a nonbroadcaster, and thus a "nonperformer"
for copyright purposes, when the signals it carries are from distant rather than
local sources.
Id.
17.
18.

WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 685 (citing Fortnightly and Teleprompter).
Id. (citing H.R. Rep. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, at 63).

The House Report rejected Fortnightlyand Teleprompter because "a cable television system is
See H.R. Rep. 94-1476,
performing when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers ...
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, at 63 (1976).
19. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 63 (1976).
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private and public was simpler than it is today.2 0 However,
unanticipated technological developments created tension between
Congress's view that retransmissions of network programs by cable
television systems should be deemed public performances and
21
Congress's intent that some transmissions be classified as private.
Some of these unanticipated technological developments, such as a
"Remote Storage DVR System" (RS-DVR), have been held to be
"private" performances. 22 In Cablevision, the RS-DVR system
split
transmission data from network broadcasts to a remote server, which
would record programs requested by the user to a hard disk associated
to that user.2Copyright holders of numerous movies and television
programs sued Cablevision for declaratory and injunctive relief.24 The
district court found that the RS-DVR system transmitted to the public
because the system still transmitted the same program to members of
the public, albeit at different times. 25 The Second Circuit reversed and
held that the RS-DVR system did not perform a transmission "to the
public." 26 In coming to this decision, the Second Circuit considered not
the potential audience of the work, but the potential audience of the
transmission in applying the Transmit Clause. 27 Further, the Second
Circuit found that because each transmission was made using a unique
copy of the broadcast, use of such a unique copy may limit the potential
audience of a transmission. 28 Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that
each RS-DVR playback transmission was not "to the public. 29

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
Supp. 2d

WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 694.
Id. at695.
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id. at 126 (citing Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F.
607, 622-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).

Under the plain language of this clause, a transmission "to the public" is a
public performance, even if members of the public receive the transmission at
separate places at different times. Such is the case here. Cablevision would
transmit the same program to members of the public, who may receive the
performance at different times, depending on whether they view the program in
real time or at a later time as an RS-DVR playback.
Id.
26. Id. at 139.
27. Id at 135-36.
28. Id. at 138.
29. See id. ("Given that each RS-DVR transmission is made to a given subscriber using a
copy made by that subscriber, we conclude that such a transmission is not 'to the public,'
without analyzing the contours of that phrase in great detail.").
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II. THE INSTANT CASE: WNET, THIRTEEN V. AEREO, INC.
The Second Circuit had a second chance of resolving the public
performance question in WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. 0u The court
once again held that Aereo's system was not a public performance as
the Aereo System was similar to the RS-DVR system in Cablevision in
two respects: (1) the Aereo System created copies of each program that
would transmit
were unique to each customer, and (2) the Aereo
3 1 System
copy.
unique
that
through
only
customer
the
to
The Second Circuit rejected a series of arguments advanced by the
case. 32
Plaintiff aimed at distinguishing Cablevision from the instant
Firstly, the court rejected the argument that Aereo did not have a
retransmission license as irrelevant to whether a transmission was
public. 33 Secondly, the court rejected an aggregation theory on the
grounds that the aggregation was based on the potential audience of the
work, rather than that of the transmission. 34 Thirdly, the court rejected
the argument that Cablevision's analysis was based on an analogy to the
VCR as irrelevant. 35 Fourthly, the Second Circuit rejected the notion
that the RS-DVR System in Cablevision broke the continuous chain of
transmission to the public unlike the Aereo system. 36 The court rejected
this argument because Aereo users exercised the same control over
playbacks as their Cablevision counterparts. 37 Additionally, the court
rejected the argument because Aereo used individual antennas that
created unique copies which limited the potential audience during the
chain of transmission to only one Aereo user, breaking up the chain of
transmission. 38 Lastly, the court rejected a "form over substance"
argument because the fact that Aereo designed its system around the
holding in Cablevision is subordinate to the importance of technical
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 689.
Id. at 690.
Id.
Id. at 690-91.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 692.
See id.
[T]he Aereo user selects what program he wishes a copy to be made of and
then controls when and how that copy is played. This second layer of control,
exercised after the copy has been created, means that Aereo's transmissions
from the recorded copies cannot be regarded as simply one link in a chain of
transmission, giving Aereo's copies the same legal significance as the RSDVR copies in Cablevision.

Id.
38.

Id. at 693.
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39

architecture.
Judge Chin, in his dissenting opinion, pointed out various flaws in
the majority's decision.
Of note, he argued that the majority
incorrectly labeled Aereo's System as "private"4 ' and because Aereo
was transmitting television signals to paying strangers, all of the
transmissions are "to the public," regardless of the fact that devices
limit the potential audience. 42 Additionally, Cablevision had a license to
broadcast while Aereo did not, and as such Aereo was essentially
streaming broadcasts over the internet in real-time, and no record
function43can legitimize the unauthorized transmission of copyrighted
content.
III. ANALYSIS
It is first important to note the Second Circuit's reluctance to
properly resolve this matter by announcing a sound rule of law that
makes sense given recent advances in communication technology.44
This not only shows the court's failure to address the ultimate issue, but
also illustrates the unnecessary complexity of the "public performance"
issue. Had the court decided to re-work its Cablevision decision, the
court may have avoided convoluting the problem altogether.
A transmission "to the public" is self explanatory. Based on the
statutory definition of publicly, "to the public" can be interpreted as the
45
negative of "a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances."
This is done by using the word "or" within the first clause as a
mechanism for substitution. While this first clause is not the Transmit
Clause, the two clauses are consecutive.46 "To the public" most likely
carries the same meaning in both clauses. Even by rejecting this
39. Id. at 693-94.
40. Id. at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting) ("Its decision, in my view, conflicts with the text of
the Copyright Act, its legislative history, and our case law.").
41. See id. at 698. Using the ordinary meaning of "the public," a transmission to anyone
other than oneself or an intimate relation is a communication to a "member of the public." See
Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2002 (2012) ("When a term goes undefined
in a statute, we give the term its ordinary meaning."); Webster's II: New Riverside University
Dictionary 951 (1994) (defining "public" as "[t]he community or the people as a group").
42. Id. at 699.
43. Id. at 702.
44. See supra note 28 ("without analyzing the contours of that phrase in great detail.")
(emphasis added).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) ("To perform or display a work 'publicly' means-(i) to
perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.")
(emphasis added).
46. Id.
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proposition, the ordinary plain meaning of "to the public" is "[t]he
community or the people as a group."4 7 Based on either the plain
meaning or the proposed meaning asserted by this author, Judge Chin is
48
correct in asserting that paying strangers are part of the public. The
plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation is in place for a reason and
manipulating a definition in order to maintain stare decisis, as the
Second Circuit did, was improper in this case.
The segmentation theory proposed by the Second Circuit in
Cablevision and the altered theory advanced by the instant case
49
contradict the Congressional intent behind the Copyright Act of 1976.
Congress, cognizant of the fact that the law should cover unforeseen
technological developments, 50 clarified its position:
[A] performance made available by transmission to the public at
large is "public" even though the recipients are not gathered in a
single place . . . [t]he same principles apply whenever the
potential recipients of the transmission represent a limited
segment of the public, such as the occupants of hotel rooms or the
subscribers of a cable television service. Clause (2) of the
definition of "publicly" is applicable "whether the members of
the public capable of receiving the performance or display
receive it in the same place51 or in separate places and at the same
time or at different times."
While the Second Circuit acknowledged that its decision in
Cablevision did not weigh the fact that the transmissions were
segmented geographically or spatially, 52 the court placed importance on
the segmentation of the audience of the transmissions, refusing to
aggregate them and instead usin the segmented audience as a factor in
favor of a private performance. However, the fact that the recipients
are segmented should cut both ways: not only should it prevent a
transmission from being deemed a public performance but it should not
be a determining factor in deeming a transmission a private
performance. Essentially, segmentation should not be determinative
either way.
Over-analyzing the definition of "to the public" has produced a
47.
48.

See supra note 39.
WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 699 (Chin, J., dissenting).

49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 700.

51.

H.R. REP. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 64-65 (emphasis

added).
52.

WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 687 (citing Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121 at 134).

53.

Id. at 691.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLA W& POLICY

[Vol. 19

result that is contrary to the public good. In essence, the Second Circuit
has allowed an unlicensed company to substitute itself as a
broadcaster.54 Despite courts rejecting Cablevision and holding that
retransmitting copyrighted television programming over the intemet
were "public performances," 55 the Second Circuit allowed Aereo to
stream copyrighted works over the internet without permission of the
copyright holders. 56 This does not make sense; either companies such as
Aereo transmit broadcasts publicly or they do not. In this respect, it is
important to consider the ends rather than the means. 57 Whether a
broadcast is public or private should depend solely on the audience, not
the method of broadcast. For example, a broadcaster retransmitting a
program without a license to its customers is a public performance,
regardless of the technical methods used.58 In this respect, the customers
are an unaffiliated collection of members of the public, therefore
making the transmission "to the public." The intricacies of whether a
licensed broadcaster can transmit individual copies to its customers is
an issue to be resolved in the scope of the license itself rather than
continuously reshaping the definition of a public performance because
of the emergence of new technologies. This prevents unlicensed
broadcasters from exploiting the current loopholes that exist within the
realm of public performance.
This view, which pins the determination of whether a broadcast is
public or private on the end audience, merely shifts the problem rather
than resolves it, but it helps settle the issue of what constitutes a public
performance. While the Second Circuit expressed concern over this
thought process entailing all broadcasts, 59 the rights of the copyright
holder should be considered as superior to those of unlicensed
broadcasters. Generalizing the distinction between public or private
performances solely on the target audience of the broadcasts would
54. Id.at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting).
55. See e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F.
Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (declining to follow Cablevision and enjoining an Aereo-like
system based on plain meaning of§ 101); WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 278, 286, 287
(2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1585 (2013) (holding that a retransmission of
copyrighted television programming by streaming it live over the internet constituted a "public
performance."); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, CIV.A. 13-758 RMC, 2013
WL 4763414 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013), reconsiderationdenied, CIV.A. 13-758 RMC, 2013 WL
4852300 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2013) (equating a commercial service retransmitting plaintiffs'
television performances as in no meaningful way different from cable television companies).
56. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 705 (Chin, J.,
dissenting).
57. See id.
at 697.
58. See Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. Broad. Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614, 651
(D.D.C. 1991) (holding that "transmission by cable programmers of programming containing
copyrighted music constitutes public performance of that music, and that they are therefore
liable for infringement for performing those works without authorization.").
59. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 687-88.
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restrict which methods of broadcasts are allowable, but these
6°
restrictions would also protect the rights of copyright holders. Without
protection a copyright is worthless. The goal of copyright protection
should be to protect the rights of copyright holders and to prevent
unlicensed groups from exploiting loopholes and undermining the
whole system of copyright protection. The instant case goes against this
bedrock principle of copyright law.
All is not lost, however. The Supreme Court has granted the
certiorari petition filed by the plaintiffs in the instant case. Maybe the
Court can re-configure the lower court's decision and reverse the
injustices tolerated by the current decision. However, the ultimate
power lies with Congress in redrafting the public performance statute.
By retooling the statute to focus on the general audience of the
broadcast rather than whether the method of transmission segmented the
audience sufficiently, the emphasis shifts to whether the transmission
resulted in the infringement of the rights of a copyright holder. This
emphasis coincides with the ultimate goal of copyright, protection of the
creation of ideas.
IV. CONCLUSION

The concept of what is a "public performance" is an ever-shaping
topic that results from an outdated law that only vaguely anticipated the
effect of future technology on the law. The law is currently ambiguous
and produces ambiguous results. Clarity is required and there are two
main options: (1) re-write the law behind public performances to more
fully and accurately incorporate the previous three and a half decades of
technological advancements, or (2) treat public performance on a broad
scale, solely looking at the intended audience of the broadcast, and
leaving the technical methods used to transmit those broadcasts to the
realm of copyright licensing.

60.
1988).

See David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 759 (S.D.N.Y.

Congress intended the definitions of "public" and "performance" to encompass
each step in the process by which a protected work wends its way to its
audience .

.

. it would strain logic to conclude that Congress would have

intended the degree of copyright protection to turn on the mere method by
which television signals are transmitted to the public.
Id.
61.

WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 680, cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014).
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